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Fall-Out: New York v. United States and the LowLevel Radioactive Waste Problem
Samantha Dreilinger∗
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

For over thirty years, the United States has failed to solve its low-level radioactive
waste problem.1 Working independently, state governments have not developed a single
new disposal site for low-level radioactive waste.2 Congress’ best efforts to address the
growing quantities of waste included passing a law that, in part, required states to accept
responsibility for all low-level radioactive waste.3 Unsurprisingly, most states opposed
this provision and were relieved when the Supreme Court deemed it unconstitutional in
New York v. United States.4 As the states and the federal government remain at an
impasse, low-level radioactive waste accumulates in countless makeshift storage facilities
across the country.5
The road to New York began in 1985 when Congress passed the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act (Amendments Act).6 The Amendments Act
put forward a series of incentives and penalties that Congress believed would persuade
states to develop disposal sites.7 The most severe and controversial penalty was the
“take-title” provision, under which a state that failed to develop or secure access to a
∗

Juris Doctor Candidate, 2010, Northwestern University School of Law. I would like to thank the editors
of the Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy for their invaluable assistance in preparing this
Article for publication. I would also like to thank David Dreilinger for his love, support, and insightful
comments on each draft.
1
Although low-level radioactive waste is only one of many types of radioactive waste produced in the
United States, it constitutes eighty-five percent of the volume and creates a majority of the disposal
problems. See Jane Chuang, Who Should Win the Garbage Wars? Lessons from the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2403, 2433, 2456 (2004) (discussing the emergence of the lowlevel radioactive crisis in the 1970s; the legislation, passed in 1980, that tried to address it; and later stating
that no new low-level radioactive waste disposal sites have been developed).
2
Id. at 2455.
3
“Accepting responsibility,” otherwise known as “taking-title,” forces states to take possession of the lowlevel radioactive waste and accept legal liability in the case of any of accident, leakage, or storage problem.
See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup; High Court Eases States’ Obligation Over Toxic Waste,
N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1992, at 1.
4
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
5
These private storage facilities lack the oversight and safety precautions of an official disposal site.
William F. Newberry, The Rise and Fall and Rise and Fall of American Public Policy on Disposal of LowLevel Radioactive Waste, 3 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 43, 43 (1993). For example, 191 generators of LLRW in New
York stored 319,803 cubic meters of low-level radioactive waste in undisclosed locations in 2008. See
N.Y. STATE ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEV. AGENCY, N.Y. STATE LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE STATUS
REPORT FOR 2008, at 17, 18 (2009) [hereinafter N.Y. STATE LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE STATUS
REPORT], available at http://www.nyserda.org/Energy_Information/llrw%202008-rev.pdf.
6
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act (Amendments Act) of 1985, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021(b)–(j) (2006).
7
Chuang, supra note 1, at 2436.
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disposal site by January 1, 1996, would be forced to accept legal ownership and liability
for all of its low-level radioactive waste.8
In the early 1990s, it was clear that the states and the federal government were
heading toward a confrontation. The Amendment Act’s deadline was rapidly
approaching, yet community opposition and legal challenges had prevented states from
beginning the lengthy process required to develop disposal sites.9 Faced with accepting
legal responsibility for thousands of feet of privately-generated low-level radioactive
waste, one state challenged the constitutionality of the Amendments Act: New York.10
New York’s challenge culminated in New York v. United States.11 In New York, the
Supreme Court struck down the take-title provision of the Amendments Act.12
According to Justice O’Connor, the take-title provision was inconsistent with the
Constitution’s division of authority between federal and state governments because it
would “‘commandeer’ state governments into the service of federal regulatory
purposes.”13
New York is widely considered to be one of the Rehnquist Court’s most important
decisions, as well as one of Justice O’Connor’s most influential opinions.14 The New
York decision is also credited with setting the limits on the affirmative powers granted by
Commerce Clause,15 reinvigorating the Tenth Amendment,16 and signaling the
resurgence of dual federalism.17 New York is a seminal decision, cited in cases dealing
with issues as far-reaching as products liability,18 assisted suicide,19 gun control,20 and
gambling on Native American Reservations.21 Unfortunately, the New York decision did
not solve the United States’ low-level radioactive waste problem. Not a single state has

8

42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C).
Richard C. Kearney, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management: Environmental Policy, Federalism, and
New York, 23 PUBLIUS 57, 62 (1993).
10
Id. at 66.
11
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
12
Id. at 188.
13
Id. at 175.
14
See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability
Rules in Tenth Amendment Infrastucture, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 39 (2010) (discussing how the New York
decision made “legal history”); Mark Latham, The Rehnquist Court and the Pollution Control Cases: AntiEnvironmental and Pro-Business?, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 133, 144 (2007) (discussing how New York was
one important case, among others, that signaled the reemergence of federalism as a powerful constitutional
doctrine in the Court).
15
See John C. Yoo & Jennifer L. Koester, Judicial Safeguards of Federalism and the Environment: Yucca
Mountain from a Constitutional Perspective, 75. U. COLO. L. REV. 1317, 1323–27 (2004) (underlying the
New York opinion was an understanding that the Framers explicitly rejected a system in which the
government would regulate the states directly).
16
See Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the
Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 565 (2007) (explaining that New York was one of the
first “New Federalism Tenth Amendment” cases defining the Tenth Amendment as a simple rule against
the federal commandeering of state apparatuses).
17
Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1328–29 (2004).
18
Robinson v. Hartzell Propeller Inc., 326 F. Supp. 2d 631, 669 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
19
Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005).
20
City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 396–97 (2d Cir. 2008).
21
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 61 n.10 (1996).
9
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developed a new low-level radioactive waste disposal site,22 leading some to view the
opinion as “‘good federalism but bad public policy.’”23
In fact, in the almost twenty years since the New York decision, the United States’
low-level radioactive waste problem has become increasingly dire. Between 1999 and
2003, the production of low-level radioactive waste increased by 200%.24 Yet, disposal
capabilities remained static. Without progress in the past two decades and with no
solution on the horizon, the United States’ low-level radioactive waste problem has been
silently, but steadily, coming to a head.25
This Comment will reintroduce the problem of low-level radioactive waste and
emphasize the pressing need for a comprehensive solution. It will trace the history of
low-level radioactive waste in the United States and the problems that led to the
Amendments Act. This Comment will then discuss the New York decision and its impact
on the current low-level radioactive waste disposal process. It will show that without an
immediate, workable solution, the low-level radioactive waste problem will become
progressively worse. The Comment concludes by offering a solution to the United
States’ low-level radioactive waste problem through a federal-state power sharing
arrangement derived, ironically, from New York, the very case that exacerbated the
dimensions of low-level radioactive waste disposal.
II. WHAT IS LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE?

¶8

Radioactive waste is generated from a variety of sources: the U.S. military’s
nuclear weapons program, commercial nuclear power plants, medical applications, and
corporate and university-based research programs.26 Low-level radioactive waste
represents eighty-five percent of all radioactive waste produced in the United States.27
Low-level radioactive waste is created when materials come into contact with radioactive
material or are exposed to neutron radiation.28 This waste typically includes items used
at research facilities, such as the clothing worn by researchers, protective shoe covers,
rags, mops, and filters.29 Tools and materials contaminated in the course of research,
such as luminous dials, medical tubes, swabs, injection needles, syringes, laboratory

22

Kearney, supra note 9, at 62.
Id. at 57 (quoting unknown commentators).
24
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-604, LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE: DISPOSAL
AVAILABILITY ADEQUATE IN THE SHORT TERM, BUT OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO IDENTIFY ANY FUTURE
SHORTFALLS 13 (June 2004) [hereinafter 2004 GAO REPORT: LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE],
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04604.pdf.
25
The issue is rarely discussed in policymaking circles or the mainstream press. However, there are a few
exceptions. Every three to four years the Government Accountability Office provides a brief update on
some aspect of low-level radioactive waste. See, e.g., id.; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07221, LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT: APPROACHES USED BY FOREIGN COUNTRIES MAY
PROVIDE USEFUL LESSONS FOR MANAGING U.S. RADIOACTIVE WASTE (2007), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07221.pdf.
26
Richard C. Kearney & John J. Stucker, Interstate Compacts and the Management of Low-Level
Radioactive Wastes, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 210, 214 (1985).
27
Chuang, supra note 1, at 2432.
28
See id.
29
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Website, Low-Level Waste, http://www.nrc.gov/waste/low-levelwaste.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2009).
23
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animal carcasses, sample tissues, and water used in nuclear reactors, also often become
low-level radioactive waste.30
¶9
The type of material and concentration of radioactivity dictates the risks associated
with each container of low-level radioactive waste.31 Some low-level radioactive waste,
such as the remnants of medical research, poses no significant hazard to humans unless
inhaled or consumed.32 However, other low-level radioactive waste, like water used in
nuclear reactors, may be extremely hazardous. Exposure to this type of waste could lead
to an increased risk of cancer or even death.33 The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) classifies low-level radioactive waste based on its potential hazards.34 Although
the classification of waste is complex, Class A waste generally contains lower
concentrations of radioactive material than Class B or Class C waste.35
¶10
Low-level radioactive waste is shipped to a disposal site by the generator in an
NRC approved container.36 The waste, usually still in the shipping container, is then
disposed of through a “shallow burial system” comprised of specially-engineered
trenches laying under several feet of soil.37 The container remains in these trenches until
it deteriorates to safe levels of radioactivity, usually twenty to thirty years.38 In 2006, the
United States disposed of approximately four million cubic feet of radioactive waste.39
¶11
Currently, there are only three operational low-level radioactive waste disposal
sites in the United States. The first site, in Barnwell, South Carolina, opened in 1971.40
Barnwell is licensed to accept Classes A, B, and C radioactive waste.41 Between the
1970s and 2008, Barnwell accepted low-level radioactive waste from all generators. In
2008, Barnwell restricted access to those generators in Connecticut, New Jersey, and
South Carolina, members of the Atlantic Compact.42
¶12
The second facility, located in Richland, Washington, opened in 1965.43 The
Richland site is licensed to accept Class A, B, and C low-level radioactive waste.44 Like
the Atlantic Compact, in 1985 the Richland site limited access to generators in Alaska,
30

Kearney & Stucker, supra note 26, at 214.
U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, RADIOACTIVE WASTE: PRODUCTION, STORAGE, DISPOSAL 24 (2002)
[hereinafter U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, RADIOACTIVE WASTE], available at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/brochures/br0216/r2/br0216r2.pdf.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 20.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 25.
37
Chuang, supra note 1, at 2433.
38
Kearney & Stucker, supra note 26, at 214.
39
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Website, Low-Level Waste Disposal Statistics,
http://www.nrc.gov/waste/llw-disposal/statistics.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2009).
40
Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing in the Siting of Hazardous and Radioactive Waste Facilities: A
Comprehensive Approach to a Misperceived Crisis, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1047, 1081 (1994).
41
S.C. Energy Office Website, Radioactive Waste Disposal Program,
http://www.energy.sc.gov/index.aspx?m=8, (last visited Jan. 14, 2009).
42
Id. The Atlantic Compact is one of several interstate compacts formed around low-level radioactive
waste disposal. See generally U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Website, Low-Level Waste Disposal,
http://www.nrc.gov/waste/llw-disposal/licensing/locations.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2010) (discussing the
unique elements of each of the interstate compacts).
43
Gerrard, supra note 40, at 1081.
44
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Website, Locations of Low-Level Waste Disposal Facilities,
http://www.nrc.gov/waste/llw-disposal/licensing/locations.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2010).
31
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Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Utah, Washington,Wyoming, Colorado, Nevada, and
New Mexico, members of the Northwest and Rocky Mountain Interstate Compacts.45
¶13
The third low-level radioactive waste disposal site is located in Clive, Utah. The
Clive site is only licensed to accept Class A waste, the least radioactive type of low-level
radioactive waste.46 Unlike the Barnwell or Richland sites, which are operated in
partnership with the state governments of South Carolina and Washington, the Clive site
is privately owned and operated. The Clive site is also the only low-level radioactive
waste disposal facility that has not restricted access to members of specific interstate
compacts.47
¶14
Although the Clive site did not start accepting low-level radioactive waste until
1988, it should not be considered a “new” site.48 Prior to receiving a license to dispose of
low-level radioactive waste, the Clive site was a “Hazardous Industrial Zone.”49 With
two hazardous waste incinerators and a hazardous waste landfill already on the premises,
the company did not have to go through the lengthy siting process or negotiations with
the state or local communities to develop an additional low-level radioactive waste
disposal site.50
III. EARLY REGULATION, 1950–1980
¶15

Radioactive waste did not accumulate in substantial quantities until after World
War II, when nuclear scientists applied the technology developed for the atomic bomb to
civilian uses such as nuclear power, industrial research, and medical innovation.51 At
first there was no government regulation of low-level radioactive waste; generators
simply dumped it into the ocean.52 In the 1950s, the National Academy of Sciences and
the Atomic Energy Commission published a study that investigated the environmental
impact of ocean dumping.53 In response, Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (AEA).54 The AEA provided the federal government the authority to fully regulate
all phases of the nuclear fuel cycle from mining to processing to storage and, finally, to
disposal of all by-products including low-level radioactive waste.55 Although the AEA
45

Washington State Department of Ecology Website, Nuclear Waste, Non-Hanford Work,
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/nwp/llrw/llrw.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2009). For information on the
Rocky Mountain Compact, see generally U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Website, Low-Level Waste
Disposal, http://www.nrc.gov/waste/llw-disposal.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
46
Chuang, supra note 1, at 2454.
47
See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Website, Locations of Low-Level Waste Disposal Facilities,
http://www.nrc.gov/waste/llw-disposal/licensing/locations.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2010) (discussing the
three operating LLRW disposal sites, with only Clive identified as “accepting waste from all regions”).
48
M.R. Ledoux & M.S. Cade, Licensing and Operation of the Clive, Utah Low-Level Radioactive
Containerized Waste Disposal Facility—A Continuation of Excellence (paper presented at the Waste
Management Conference, Feb. 22–24, 2002, Tucson, Ariz.) (on file with Merrill-Cazier Library, Utah State
University), available at
http://digitalcommons.usu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=govdocs.
49
Id. at 2.
50
Id.
51
Chuang, supra note 1, at 2432.
52
Kearney & Stucker, supra note 26, at 214; Chuang, supra note 1, at 2432.
53
Kearney & Stucker, supra note 26, at 214.
54
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1976)); see
Kearney, supra note 9, at 59.
55
Kearney, supra note 9, at 59.
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provided a uniform and efficient system, the states wanted input and some control over
the location of low-level radioactive waste disposal sites. Congress incorporated these
concerns when the AEA was amended in 1959.56
¶16
In 1960, pursuant to the AEA, the federal government granted licenses to private
companies to develop disposal facilities.57 The companies could select the location of a
disposal site, but were required to receive the approval of state and local government
officials before building the facilities.58 State officials encouraged the development of
disposal facilities in order to attract “high-tech” industriesthe future of the economy
that they believed would require low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities.59 In
1961, the first low-level radioactive waste disposal site opened in Beatty, Nevada.60 Over
the next decade, similar arrangements led to five new disposal sites located in Kentucky,
Washington, Illinois, New York, and South Carolina.61 At the time, these six disposal
facilities were able to accommodate all of the United States’ low-level radioactive waste.
¶17
Problems arose between 1975 and 1978 when the federal government shut down
three of the disposal sites due to poor management. Leaks at the New York and
Kentucky sites created pools of radioactive ground water.62 The Illinois site was closed
because the land area reached capacity, and the NRC refused to license space for
additional burial.63 At the same time, highly publicized accidents at nuclear facilities,
such as Three-Mile Island,64 created strong anti-nuclear sentiments that foreclosed any
chance a community might allow a new low-level radioactive waste site to be
developed.65
¶18
By 1979 there were only three operational low-level radioactive waste disposal
sites remaining. Only one of these sites, Barnwell, South Carolina, was located near the
east coast where the majority of low-level radioactive waste was generated.66 Low-level
radioactive waste is very expensive to transport, and, as a result, Barnwell received eighty
to ninety percent of the United States’ low-level radioactive waste.67 The situation
reached a crisis point when, later that year, two of the remaining three sites, Richland,
Washington and Beatty, Nevada, were temporarily shut down for improperly handling
and packaging of low-level radioactive waste.68 During this time Barnwell was the only
56

Id.
Newberry, supra note 5, at 45.
58
Id. at 46.
59
Id.
60
Kearney & Stucker, supra note 26, at 214.
61
Id.
62
See Chuang, supra note 1, at 2433–34 n.304 (discussing how three low-level radioactive waste sites were
closed by 1978 due to ground water pooling and radioactive leachate contamination; the locations of these
sites, New York, Kentucky, and Illinois are identified in the footnote).
63
Kearney & Stucker, supra note 26, at 214.
64
The Three Mile Island accident of 1979 was a partial core meltdown of the Three Mile Island Nuclear
Generating Station in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. It was the most significant accident in the history of
the American commercial nuclear power generating industry, resulting in the release of an estimated
43,000 curies of radioactive krypton. See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Website, Backgrounder on
the Three Mile Island Accident, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html
(last visited Apr. 4, 2010).
65
Newberry, supra note 5, at 46.
66
Kearney & Stucker, supra note 26, at 216.
67
Id. at 214–15.
68
Chuang, supra note 1, at 2434.
57
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available low-level radioactive waste disposal site in the country. Faced with an
increasing amount of waste, South Carolina feared it would become the “nuclear
dumping ground” for the rest of the country.69 The governor soon announced that the
Barnwell site would halve the amount of waste it received over the next two years and
increase its disposal fees for low-level radioactive waste by 600%.70 The governors of
Nevada and Washington, afraid of being left with the waste previously sent to South
Carolina, also threatened to increase prices and restrict access to disposal sites.71
IV. THE ROAD TO NEW YORK V. UNITED STATES, 1980–1992
A. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act
¶19

With low-level radioactive waste accumulating around the country and the looming
possibility that the United States would be left with no disposal sites, Congress decided to
take action.72 Congress swiftly passed the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of
1980 (Policy Act).73 The Policy Act, based on a proposal authored by the disposal site
states,74 had two basic provisions. First, states were responsible for securing access to a
disposal site.75 This could be accomplished either by independently developing a site, or
by forming an interstate compact with other states. Second, after January 1, 1986, the
states with disposal sites would have the authority to restrict the use of their disposal sites
to states within their compacts.76
¶20
States immediately rushed to form interstate compacts.77 Although interstate
compacts are not widely understood, they are a method of intergovernmental cooperation
provided for in the Constitution,78 and they have been been utilized for over 200 years to
regulate trade and commerce between the states.79 Interstate compacts appeared to be an
elegant solution to the low-level radioactive waste problem. For one, it was neither
efficient nor practical for every state to develop a disposal site since, under a state
compact, only one state in the compact would have to develop a low-level radioactive
waste disposal site. Moreover, these interstate compacts allowed the states to work
together without interference from the federal government, giving them the autonomy
they perpetually requested.
¶21
Unfortunately, the Policy Act did not require any particular configuration for the
compacts. States were left to grope and barter with their neighbors over endless
69

Thomas O’Toole, A Dump Closing Threatens to Halt Cancer Research, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1979, at
A1.
70
Kearney, supra note 9, at 61.
71
Gerrard, supra note 40, at 1081.
72
Chuang, supra note 1, at 2432.
73
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act (Policy Act) of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-573, § 2189, 94 Stat.
3347 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2021b–2021d (1995)).
74
See Kearney, supra note 9, at 60–61 (discussing how in testimony before Congress, the governors of the
three host site states recommended that the national LLRW policy encompass two basic principles, which
were then included in the Policy Act).
75
Policy Act § 4(a)(1).
76
Policy Act § 4(a)(2)(B).
77
Kearney, supra note 9, at 61.
78
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No state shall, without the consent of Congress . . . enter into any
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign power.”).
79
Kearney & Stucker, supra note 26, at 210.
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permutations of the compact arrangements.80 By treating each state as an equal
sovereign, the law posed a particular problem for states that generated little waste.81
Discussing the plight of these states in later years, the Department of Energy noted:
Regardless of whether a State generates large amounts of low-level waste,
or virtually none at all, the State must commit substantial resources to
finding ways to dispose of its waste within the time period set forth in the
Act. States that generate very small amounts of low-level waste continue
to face legal, financial and political challenges disproportional to their
contribution to the national waste management burden. For example, six
unaffiliated States (Maine, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
South Dakota and Vermont) and the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico,
shipped a total of 16,080 cubic feet of low-level waste for disposal in
1988. This represents about 1 percent of the total volume of waste shipped
for disposal nationally.82
Despite the inherent difficulties posed by the compacting process, states understood that
securing access to a disposal site was crucial. By 1984, thirty-six states had entered into
eight compacts.83
¶22
With the interstate compacts in place, states embarked on the second phase of the
Policy Act: developing a disposal site. Unfortunately, as the states soon realized,
developing a low-level radioactive disposal site was going to be even more difficult than
the compacting process. By 1985, only three of the interstate compacts had access to an
operating disposal site. Not surprisingly, these were the compacts that formed around the
original disposal sites in South Carolina, Nevada, and Washington. With the Policy Act’s
January 1st deadline less than six months away, thirty one states would soon have no
assured outlet for their low-level radioactive waste. The original disposal site states, still
hosting the only three operating facilities in the United States, did not want to accept the
waste from these states and renewed their threats to restrict access to the disposal sites.
Congress and the states were at a standstill yet again.
B. Low-level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act
¶23

Congress, with the assistance of the National Governors Association (NGA),
drafted a “transition package” to ensure access to the current sites while states completed
the lengthy process required to develop new low-level radioactive waste disposal sites.84
The result was the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendment Act of 1985
(Amendments Act).85 Similar to the Policy Act, under the Amendments Act each state

80

Newberry, supra note 5, at 48.
Id.
82
Id. (quoting the U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, 1988 ANNUAL REPORT ON LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE
MANAGEMENT PROGRESS 37 (1989)).
83
Kearney & Stucker, supra note 26, at 216.
84
Chuang, supra note 1, at 2435.
85
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act (Amendments Act) of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-240,
99 Stat. 1842 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2021e (2006)).
81
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was responsible for the disposal of its low-level radioactive waste.86 It also encouraged
states to enter into interstate compacts to provide for the establishment and operation of
low-level radioactive waste sites.87 The important difference between the two pieces of
legislation was that Congress, reacting to criticism that the Policy Act was hasty and
vague, included three provisions in the Amendments Act that established a variety of
milestones, incentives, and penalties that made it increasingly costly to states that did not
secure access to a low-level radioactive waste disposal site.88
¶24
The first provision offered monetary incentives. States with disposal sites could
levy a surcharge for out-of-region waste which could be increased every few years.89
One quarter of the surcharges collected were to be transferred to an escrow account held
by the Secretary of Energy.90 The Secretary would then partially reimburse all states that
complied with the following deadlines: by July 1, 1986, states were required to either join
a compact or indicate that they planned to “go it alone”;91 by January 1, 1988, each state
that joined a compact had to identify which state had been selected to host the low-level
radioactive waste disposal site, announce where the site would be located, and develop a
siting plan;92 by January 1, 1990, each new disposal compact or single-state disposal site
was required to file an application for an operational license.93 States failing to meet the
deadlines would not recover the money in the escrow account and could be assessed even
greater surcharges for access to a disposal site.94
¶25
The second provision allowed host states to deny access to low-level radioactive
waste disposal sites if certain milestones were not met. If a state missed either the July
1986 deadline or the January 1988 deadline by one year, or the January 1990 deadline at
all, the Washington, Nevada, and South Carolina disposal sites could refuse to accept that
states’ low-level radioactive waste.95
¶26
The third provision was the take-title provision at issue in New York v. United
States. If a state was unable to develop or secure access to a disposal site by January 1,
1996, it would take-title to all low-level radioactive waste generated within its borders.96
Taking-title meant that a state would take possession of all of the waste generated within
its borders and become liable for all damages “directly or indirectly incurred by such
generator or owner as a consequence of the failure to take possession.”97 The take-title
provision was thus a steep penalty because it forced state governments to manage the
storage and disposal of low-level radioactive waste without the expertise and equipment
of the generators. It also required states to accept legal liability for accidents, leaks, or
86

42 U.S.C. § 2021c (a)(1)(A) (2006).
§ 2021d (a)(2).
88
Carol S. Weissert & Jeffery S. Hill, Low-level Radioactive Waste Compacts: Lessons Learned from
Theory and Practice, PUBLIUS, Fall 2004, at 27, 35.
89
See 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(1) (providing that a disposal site state could charge as follows: in 1986 and
1987, ten dollars per cubic foot; in 1988 and 1989, twenty dollars per cubic foot; in 1990, 1991, and 1992,
forty dollars per cubic foot of low-level radioactive waste).
90
§ 2021e(d)(2)(A).
91
§ 2021e(e)(1)(A).
92
§ 2021e(e)(1)(B)(i–ii).
93
§ 2021e(e)(2)(C).
94
§ 2021e(e)(2)(A), (B), (D).
95
§ 2021e(e)(2)(A), (B), (D).
96
§ 2021e(d)(2)(C).
97
§ 2021e(d)(2)(C).
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any other of the host of harms that can accompany the transportation, storage, or disposal
of low-level radioactive waste.
Congress hoped that this mix of incentives, milestones, and deadlines would
encourage states to develop low-level radioactive waste disposal sites. Unfortunately,
even with concrete deadlines and attractive incentives, states could not comply with the
Amendments Act.
Compacts adopted a hybrid “public participation”98 and “incentive”99 model for
siting waste disposal facilities that required input from the affected communities at all
stages of the site’s development and tried to facilitate acceptance through incentives.100
Unsurprisingly, communities across the country were not amenable to the proposition of
a radioactive waste disposal site in their neighborhoods. This phenomenon is known as
“not-in-my-back-yard” (NIMBY). NIMBY is not limited to environmental or “no-nuke”
activists.101 Rather, NIMBY activists are people who oppose disposal sites for diverse,
but ostensibly deeply felt, reasons.102 NIMBY sentiments are pervasive for all locally
unwanted land-use decisions, including: airports, prisons, solid waste incinerators, and
landfills.103 However, NIMBY sentiments are “particularly vitriolic toward hazardous
and radioactive waste.”104 Responses to a word-association survey of attitudes toward a
nuclear waste repository, for example, revealed “pervasive qualities of dread, revulsion,
and anger.”105
States invested enormous amounts of time, effort, and money to pacify the strong
NIMBY sentiments that quickly materialized at the mere mention of nuclear waste. New
York, for example, offered prospective host communities a bundle of incentives worth an
estimated two million dollars.106 New York also promised to preserve open spaces and
create local jobs.107 Yet not one community was willing to let the state develop a lowlevel radioactive waste disposal site.
The concerns of NIMBY activists illustrate the difficulty of convincing a
community to accept a process that is inherently inequitable.108 Developing a low-level
radioactive waste disposal site creates a burden on one community for the benefit of
another.109 As a result, regardless of the type of waste, communities oppose disposal
sites. For example, plans to develop new municipal waste landfills spur, almost
immediately, numerous legal challenges.110 States dealing with low-level radioactive
98

See Gerrard, supra note 40, at 1158 (describing the public participation model and explaining that the
most common forms of participation are public hearings, citizen advisory boards, and membership on siting
boards).
99
See, e.g., Jay Romano, Radioactive Waste? Nimby, Towns Tell State, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1995, at NJ1
(explaining that New York promised communities to preserve open spaces and create local jobs in return
for the ability to develop a LLRW disposal site).
100
See Chuang, supra note 1, at 2458 (describing the modern siting process as a mix of public participation
and compensation schemes).
101
Kearney, supra note 9, at 63.
102
Id. at 63–64.
103
Id. at 63.
104
Id.
105
Newberry, supra note 5, at 44.
106
Romano, supra note 99, at NJ1.
107
Id.
108
Gerrard, supra note 40, at 1122–25.
109
Chuang, supra note 1, at 2440.
110
Id. at 2415–23 (discussing the many court cases that resulted from municipal waste siting).

192

Vol. 5:1]

Samantha Dreilinger

waste, therefore, not only encounter the traditional opposition to waste sites, but also
must overcome the stigma and fear that attaches to anything related to nuclear power or
radioactive waste.
¶31
Unable to placate the NIMBY activists, and afraid that any announcement of a
potential low-level radioactive waste disposal site would bring negative state-wide
attention, state officials hoped that they could meet their obligations under the
Amendments Act by incentivizing or bullying another compact member to host the
disposal site. Relations in these compacts tended to be cooperative until one state was
selected by the others to host the low-level radioactive waste disposal site.111 At that
point the state either dropped out,112 was expelled,113 or instituted litigation to enjoin the
compact’s decision.114
¶32
An example of inter-compact discord is Nebraska’s litigation against the Central
Midwest Compact (Midwest Compact). After it was selected to host a disposal site,
Nebraska quickly commenced multiple lawsuits.115 In Nebraska v. Central Interstate
Low-level Radioactive Waste Commission, Nebraska claimed that the Midwest Compact
did not have the authority to enforce a deadline for developing a disposal site.116
Specifically, it disagreed with the decision of the Midwest Compact’s governing
committee to file an action to enforce the siting deadline.117 The Eighth Circuit found for
the Midwest Compact, but acknowledged that the only relief available was allowing the
Midwest Compact to file an additional action to enforce Nebraska’s obligations or
revoking its membership.118 The court pointed out that revoking a state's membership
would be pointless because it did nothing to further the development of a disposal site,119
and would thus be “akin to curing the disease by killing the patient.”120
¶33
Nebraska requested that the Supreme Court review the Eighth Circuit’s decision.121
However, before the Supreme Court could grant or deny certiorari, Nebraska and the
Central Interstate Compact Commission reached a court-approved settlement.122
Nebraska agreed to withdraw its Supreme Court appeal and the Compact Commission
agreed to file a “Satisfaction of Judgment” upon Nebraska’s timely payment of a $140.5
111

Kevin M. Johnson, Note, Waste Not, Want Not: Upholding the Integrity of Interstate Compacts, 8 MO.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 18, 18–19 (2001).
112
See Chuang, supra note 1, at 2454 (discussing how North Carolina withdrew from the Southeast
Compact after it was unable to develop a disposal facility).
113
Kearney, supra note 9, at 62; see AUDEEN W. FENTIMAN ET AL., OHIO STATE UNIV., RER-62,
FACTSHEET: HISTORY OF THE MIDWEST INTERSTATE LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE COMPACT,
http://ohioline.osu.edu/rer-fact/rer_62.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2010) (discussing how Michigan was
expelled from the Midwest Compact after it was selected as a host state and “failed to live up to its
obligations”).
114
Johnson, supra note 111, at 23.
115
Id.
116
187 F.3d 982 (8th Cir. 1999).
117
Id. at 988.
118
See id. at 986 (discussing how the Midwest Compact can either commence an action to enforce
Nebraska’s obligations or revoke its membership).
119
Johnson, supra note 111, at 25.
120
Id.
121
NEB. DEP’T ENVTL. QUALITY, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 78 (2004), available at
http://www.deq.state.ne.us/Publica.nsf/a9f87abbcc29fa1f8625687700625436/149e36a9156f0512862570ca
007e3652/$FILE/CH-8LLRW.pdf.
122
Id.
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million dollar settlement.123 Nebraska then terminated its membership in the Compact
and closed its low-level radioactive waste program.124
¶34
By the early 1990s it was clear that compacts not affiliated with an original
disposal site were not going to meet the deadlines imposed by the Amendments Act.
States working together in compacts could still not overcome NIMBY protests. NIMBY
protests made states reluctant to host sites, and, as the Nebraska court pointed out, intercompact litigation cured the “disease” for the designated host state, but “killed the
patient.” Years were wasted, thousands of dollars were spent, and many states were still
no closer to developing low-level waste disposal sites.125
¶35
New York, a state that generated a relatively large share of the United States’ lowlevel radioactive waste,126 was not going to meet the 1996 deadline.127 After declining to
join a compact, New York decided that it would comply with the Amendments Act by
siting and financing a disposal facility within the state.128 Like many states, New York
formed a Low-level Radioactive Waste Siting Commission (N.Y. Commission) to
oversee the siting process.129 Each of the N.Y. Commission’s decisions were met by
vociferous objections.130 For example, when Williamsburg, New York was identified as
an interim storage site, hundreds of angry residents protested outside city hall and the
proposed storage site for days.131 Opposition grew when New York announced five
potential locations for a permanent low-level radioactive waste disposal site.132 State
officials soon realized that strong NIMBY sentiments would prevent New York from
meeting the 1996 deadline. New York was stuck: theoretically, it should support the
solution drafted by Congress and the NGA, yet state officials did not want to accept
responsibility and liability for all of its low-level radioactive waste. In the end, state
officials, concerned about the negative publicity that would result from developing a site
and the ramifications of the take-title provision, decided to challenge the Amendments
Act in court.133

123

Id.
Id. (“As a result of this agreement, the agency plans to close out its Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Program Activities. The Department has not requested additional general funds to operate the program. In
addition to activities related to program closeout, current Low-Level Radioactive Waste program staff have
assumed other duties in the agency. One staff member will have a continuing role monitoring national lowlevel radioactive waste activities.”).
125
See Johnson, supra note 111, at 19.
126
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 154 (1992); see also U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Website, Low-Level Waste Compacts, http://www.nrc.gov/waste/llw-disposal/licensing/compacts.html
(last visited Apr. 4, 2010) (stating that New York generates seventy percent of U.S. LLRW).
127
See Kearney, supra note 9, at 66 (describing the many difficulties encountered by New York when it
attempted to site a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility, and how this, plus wide spread “citizen
resistance,” led the state and two counties to file the law suit).
128
New York, 505 U.S. at 154.
129
Gary Pierre, Neighborhood Report: Williamsburg; Breathing Easier After the Last Shipment of
Radioactive Waste, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1994, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/12/nyregion/neighborhood-report-williamsburg-breathing-easier-afterlast-shipment.html?pagewanted=1.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Richard Weiner, New York v. United States: Federalism and the Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive
Waste, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 197, 200 (1994).
133
See generally Greenhouse, supra note 3, at 1.
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V. NEW YORK V. UNITED STATES

¶36

In New York v. United States, New York alleged that the Amendments Act violated
the Constitution’s Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, and the Guarantee Clause.134 Connecticut, New Jersey, and fifteen other
states filed or joined briefs on New York's behalf.135 The states of Washington, Nevada,
and South Carolina joined the federal government as defendants.136 The District Court
for the Northern District of New York dismissed New York’s complaint.137 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision.138 On appeal, New
York limited its complaint to allege only violations of the Tenth Amendment and the
Guarantee Clause.139 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.140 In a six-to-three
decision, the Court held that the take-title provision of the Amendments Act violated the
Tenth Amendment.141
¶37
The Court, in an opinion written by the steadfast states’ rights advocate Justice
O’Connor, began its analysis of the Amendments Act with the monetary-incentive
provision.142 States with disposal sites could impose a surcharge on low-level radioactive
waste received from other states. Further, the Secretary of Energy could collect a portion
of this surcharge and place it in an escrow account.143 A percentage of these funds would
be dispersed to states that achieved a series of milestones outlined in the Amendments
Act.144 According to the Court, moving waste from state to state was interstate
commerce and Congress had the authority under the Commerce Clause to force states to
charge a fee for accepting low-level radioactive waste from other states.145 Similarly,
relinquishing a portion of the surcharge to the Secretary of Energy was found to be
permissible as a federal tax on interstate commerce.146 Returning some of this money to
states that achieved milestones was found to be a valid exercise of the Spending Clause:
Congress may place conditions, such as attaining certain milestones, upon the receipt of
federal funds.147 According to the Court, the monetary-incentive provision was
comparable to other permissible congressional actions, such as making a portion of
federal highway funding contingent on a state raising the legal drinking age from
eighteen to twenty-one.148
134

505 U.S. 144, 154 (1992).
Greenhouse, supra note 3, at 1.
136
New York, 505 U.S. at 154.
137
New York v. United States, 757 F. Supp. 10, 10 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
138
New York v. United States, 924 F.2d 114, 115 (2d Cir. 1991).
139
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 154 (1992). The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
provides that “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, § 4,
cl. 1 of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union
a Republican Form of Government.”
140
New York, 505 U.S. at 145.
141
See id.
142
Id. at 171.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 176–77.
146
Id. at 171.
147
Id. at 173.
148
Id. at 158 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987)).
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The Court also upheld the Amendments Act’s denial-of-access provision.149 In this
provision, Congress authorized states and regional compacts with disposal sites to
gradually increase the fees for accepting low-level radioactive waste, eventually refusing
to accept all out-of-state or out-of-compact waste from states that did not meet federal
guidelines.150 Similar to the monetary-incentives provision, the Court found support for
this provision in the Commerce Clause.151 Although New York claimed that this
provision was merely a mechanism to force states to regulate low-level radioactive waste
according to the federal program, the Court maintained that the provision provided states
a choice.152 States could either regulate the disposal of radioactive waste according to
federal guidelines, or the state’s generators of low-level radioactive waste would be
prohibited from exporting the waste.153 This was an acceptable exercise of the
Commerce Clause because, unlike the impermissible take-title provision discussed
below, the burden of non-compliance fell on those who generated the waste, not on the
state as a sovereign.154 Under this provision, a state that did not want to comply with the
Amendments Act would not be forced to spend any money or participate in a federal
program.155
¶39
While the previous two provisions of the Amendments Act were found to
encourage states to provide low-level radioactive waste disposal sites, the Court held that
the take-title provision violated the Tenth Amendment because it “crossed the line
distinguishing encouragement from coercion.”156 The take-title provision provided that
any state that did not develop a disposal site or join an interstate compact that had access
to a site by January 1, 1996 became liable for all damages caused by the inability to
export low-level radioactive waste.157 Put simply, a state could either adhere to the
milestones of the Amendments Act or accept ownership of all its low-level radioactive
waste.
¶40
The Court found that the take-title provision provided two unconstitutional options
that would “commandeer[] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling
them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.”158 First, Congress could not
simply transfer the waste from the generators to the state government because “forced
transfer, standing alone, would in principle be no different than a congressionally
compelled subsidy from state governments to radioactive waste producers.”159 Second,
Congress could not assign liability to the state for waste produced by non-governmental
entities, which the Court noted “would be indistinguishable from an Act of Congress
directing the States to regulate in a way that accepted the liabilities of certain state
residents.”160 Thus, because both the instruction to state governments to take title and the
¶38
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Id. at 174.
Id. at 173.
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Id. at 174.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (2006).
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New York, 505 U.S. at 176 (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n., Inc., 452 U.S.
264, 288 (1981)).
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Id. at 175.
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Id.
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direct order to regulate were beyond the authority of Congress, “it follows that Congress
lacks the power to offer the States a choice between the two.”161
¶41
This ruling, however, was not the end of the Amendments Act. According to the
Court, the take-title provision was severable from the rest of the legislation, meaning it
could be removed and the overall intent of the Amendments Act would still be intact.162
As a result, the first two provisions of the Amendments Act continued, and continue, to
guide states struggling with low-level radioactive waste. Pursuant to the Policy Act and
the Amendments Act, a state has three options: (1) it can join an interstate compact that
has access to an existing site, (2) it can join an interstate compact and, with the other
states, try to develop a site, or (3) it can work independently to develop a site. States with
disposal sites are allowed to levy surcharges and restrict or deny access to out-of-compact
states.163 However, without the take-title provision, if a state fails to develop a disposal
mechanism, there is no penalty.164 Without penalties, state officials have no motivation
to risk the ire of NIMBY activists or enforce contentious interstate-compact decisions.
New York may have reinvigorated the Tenth Amendment and represented “good
federalism,”165 but without a single new disposal site, it is now clear that it led to bad
public policy.
VI. LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE TODAY: NEW YORK’S FALL-OUT
¶42

The New York decision put the states in a predicament they have yet to resolve.
States are required to find a solution to their low-level radioactive waste problem, but
lack the tools necessary to overcome strong NIMBY protests or enforce interstate
compact decisions. As a result, more and more states are turning to the most convenient
solution available: forcing generators that are unable to pay for access to disposal sites to
hold their waste in unofficial, makeshift storage facilities.
¶43
New York’s experience illustrates this dilemma. State officials’ first response to
New York was to attempt to negotiate a regional compact with neighboring states.166
When this failed, they tried to join an existing compact.167 This effort was no more
successful: other states were deterred by New York’s large volume of low-level
radioactive waste and the negative iniquities that would result from joining a compact
with a bigger and notoriously aggressive state.168 With no possibility of access to a
disposal site outside of the state, and NIMBY sentiments preventing the development of a
disposal site within its borders, state officials were stuck, again.169 New York decided

161

Id. at 176.
Id. at 186.
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42 U.S.C. §§ 2021e(d)(1), 2021e(e)(2)(A–D) (2006).
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See Kearney, supra note 9, at 69 (discussing the impact of eliminating the take-title provision).
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Id. at 57.
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Id. at 65
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Id.
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Id.
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It was NIMBY and the inability to build a site that led to New York v. United States. See id. at 66
(explaining that after the public protests, demonstrations, civil disobendience, and “citizen resistance,” New
York filed a lawsuit seeking to have the Amendments Act struck down).
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that its only solution was to pass the responsibility of dealing with low-level radioactive
waste to the generators.170
¶44
Currently, generators in New York have only two disposal options: they can ship
their waste to an official disposal site at considerable expense, or they can store their
waste onsite.171 Neither option is sustainable. After the Barnwell, South Carolina site
restricted access to members of its compact in 2008, the only site that will accept waste
from New York is in Clive, Utah. Transporting low-level radioactive waste is very
expensive and New York generators that choose this option must pay to ship their waste
over 2250 miles.172 All generators that cannot or will not pay for official disposal must
store the waste on their premises or pay for interim storage. These makeshift storage
facilities lack the proper oversight and safety features of an official site.173 As a result,
in 2008 alone, 191 generators of low-level radioactive waste in New York stored
approximately 319,803 cubic feet of low-level radioactive waste in undisclosed
locations.174
VII.

THE FUTURE OF LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE

¶45

The most obvious solution to the problem of low-level radioactive waste disposal,
eliminating or modifying the processes and procedures that create such waste, is
unrealistic. Low-level radioactive waste is an inevitable by-product of essential medical
and scientific research,175 and continues to be produced in greater quantities.176 Further,
climate change concerns may lead to more nuclear power plants, which are considered
relatively clean energy sources but which also generate low-level radioactive waste. 177
¶46
As the quantity of low-level radioactive waste increases, the probability that it will
be disposed of safely at an official site decreases. The few operating disposal sites
consistently capitalize on the waste-disposal monopoly; over the last decade disposal fees
have increased from $40 per cubic foot to over $300 per cubic foot.178 As a result, states
170

See id. at 69 (stating that after the New York decision the State of New York considered temporary
storage facilities, but most states were expecting to force generators to store the waste indefinitely). New
York also passed the The New York State Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act, which requires
low-level radioactive waste generators in the state to submit annual reports to NYSERDA providing
detailed information on waste generated, stored, and disposed. See N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1854-d (1995).
171
The reporting form for generators in New York has only two options: disposal or storage. See generally
N.Y. STATE LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE STATUS REPORT, supra note 5 (discussing the amounts of
low-level radioactive waste generated in New York that was stored or disposed of in 2008).
172
Author’s calculation based on distance from New York City to Clive, Utah via highway.
173
See Kearney, supra note 9, at 70 (explaining that unofficial storage sites could be damaged by natural
disasters).
174
See N.Y. STATE LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE STATUS REPORT, supra note 5, at 17, 18.
175
See Chuang, supra note 1, at 2432, 2434 (explaining that civilian low-level radioactive waste is mostly
created through nuclear power, industrial research, and medical applications, and that lack of access to lowlevel radioactive waste disposal sites “prompted scares that valuable medical research would be stopped in
its tracks”).
176
According to data provided by the three commercial low-level radioactive waste disposal facility
operators, disposal volumes grew to about twelve million cubic feet in 2003, an increase of 200% over
1999. 2004 GAO REPORT: LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE , supra note 24, at 4.
177
See, e.g., Larry Rohter, 2 Endorsements of Nuclear Power, but Sharp Differences on Details, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, at A25 (noting that increased nuclear power was endorsed by both presidential
candidates).
178
Chuang, supra note 1, at 2455.

198

Vol. 5:1]

Samantha Dreilinger

have no choice but to allow generators to store, rather than dispose of, low-level
radioactive waste. This leads to low-level radioactive waste in warehouses, closets, and
storerooms in research laboratories and nondescript buildings across the country.179
These unofficial storage facilities lack the safety precautions and expertise of an official
disposal site, greatly increasing the probability of accidents or contamination.180
¶47
The United States can address the low-level radioactive waste problem in three
ways: (1) maintain the status quo with states controlling waste disposal, (2) return control
to the federal government, or (3) establish a federal-state power-sharing arrangement
within the confines of New York.
A. Status Quo
¶48

There is no need to revisit at length the arguments against maintaining the current
low-level radioactive waste disposal system. States have failed to build a single new
disposal site since the 1970s. The production of low-level radioactive waste each year
exceeds the United States’ disposal capabilities. There is an alarming trend of storing
low-level radioactive waste in makeshift storage facilities.
¶49
Proponents of maintaining the status quo could suggest that, although slow, recent
progress toward a new low-level radioactive waste disposal site in Texas supports the
current system. In early 2009, Valhi Inc. announced that the Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality (TCEQ) approved its license for a new disposal site in Andrews
County, Texas.181 Valhi noted that the Texas hospital system supported the Andrews
County disposal site, which would be open to generators in Texas and Vermont, 182
because it would ensure that the “diagnosis, treatment and research of cancer and other
life threatening diseases, which generate such wastes, can continue.”183 According to the
company:
This is an important milestone for . . . the people of Andrews and Lea
Counties and the states of Texas and Vermont. . . . In addition to providing
more than 75 new jobs at our Andrews County facility, this license will
ensure that Texas and Vermont hospitals, universities, power plants and
other enterprises will be able to continue operating with the knowledge
that there is an assured solution for the permanent disposal of their [lowlevel radioactive waste].184

¶50

However, what the Valhi press release failed to mention is that this was not the first
time TCEQ approved the development of a new low-level radioactive waste disposal site
in Texas.185 On at least two occasions, companies were forced to abandon potential
179

Newberry, supra note 5, at 44.
Philip Abelson, Low-Level Radioactive Waste, 268 SCIENCE 1547, 1547 (1995).
181
Press Release, Valhi, Inc., Vahli, Inc. Announces Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal License
Decision (Aug. 12, 2008), available at
http://www.static.istockanalyst.com/article/viewiStockNews/articleid/2506754.
182
U.S. Nuclear Regulation Commission, Low-Level Waste Compacts, http://www.nrc.gov/waste/llwdisposal/compacts.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2009).
183
Id.
184
Valhi, Inc., supra note 180.
185
American Geological Institute, Government Affairs Program, Update and Hearing Summary on Low180
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disposal sites when their announcement sparked community opposition and litigation.186
In fact, since 1980, the State of Texas and private investors have spent more than $1
billion in unsuccessful attempts to license, develop, and operate low-level radioactive
waste disposal sites.187
¶51
Unsurprisingly, the plan to develop the Andrews County site also faces opposition.
Andrews County residents are divided on the issue, and community organizations are
already planning to protest.188 The Sierra Club, an environmental non-profit, is
investigating a legal appeal to TCEQ’s decision.189 In short, there is nothing to indicate
that Valhi will be any more successful than its predecessors.190
B. Federal Solution
¶52

The second option is to allow the federal government to control all aspects of lowlevel radioactive waste disposal. Federal responsibility for low-level radioactive waste is
not a new proposition. In the 1950s, the Atomic Energy Act gave the federal government
the sole power to regulate all phases of the nuclear fuel cycle, including the disposal of
low-level radioactive waste.191
¶53
The federal solution would also fit within the confines of the New York decision.
Justice O’Connor’s opinion did not forbid the federal government from regulating lowlevel radioactive waste. In fact, Justice O’Connor affirmed that the Commerce Clause
gives Congress this power.192 Justice O’Connor struck down the take-title provision
because it would “commandeer” the state governments for a federal purpose. 193 Placing
responsibility solely with the federal government, however, would not make state
officials accountable for the decisions of the federal government.
¶54
The problem with the federal solution is that states would immediately oppose any
proposal that allowed for exclusive federal control of the siting and operation of a lowlevel radioactive waste diposal facility. Lobbying by state governments was a major
factor in the federal government’s decision to abandon the AEA, under which it
controlled low-level radioactive waste disposal, for the Amendments Act, which provided
for a federal-state power-sharing arrangement. State officials are understandably
reluctant to let the federal government dictate the location of low-level radioactive waste
disposal sites. State officials may also fear that relinquishing control over low-level
Level Nuclear Waste Disposal (Oct. 23, 1998), http://www.agiweb.org/legis105/lownuke.html.
186
See American Geological Institute, Government Affairs Program, Low-level Radioactive Waste Update
(Oct. 4, 1998), http://www.agiweb.org/gap/legis107/lowlevel_waste.html (discussing the abandonment of
potential sites in Fort Hancock and Sierra Blanca).
187
Id.
188
See West Texas County to Vote on Funding Nuke Site, DAILY FIN., May 7, 2009,
http://www.dailyfinance.com/rtn/ap/west-texas-county-to-vote-on-funding-nukesite/rfid211319739/?channel=pf (providing quotes from residents wary of supporting the site and
community organizations planning to oppose the measure); Sarah Snyder, WCS Disposal Site Stirs
Controversy Among Environmentalists (Apr. 30, 2009),
http://nukefreetexas.org/news_NewsWest9_043009.html (discussing how environmental activists are
printing up postcards, running ads, and holding meetings in protest to the site).
189
Texas Approves Nation’s Largest Low-Level Radioactive Waste Site, ENVTL. NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 14,
2009, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jan2009/2009-01-14-093.asp.
190
Id.
191
Kearney, supra note 9, at 59. The AEA is discussed at length in Part III, supra.
192
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 171 (1992).
193
See id.
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radioactive waste disposal sites will set a precedent for other contested siting processes,
like landfills.194 Thus, although constitutional, state opposition would likely prevent
Congress from passing a law that gives the federal government complete control over the
low-level radioactive waste disposal process.
C. Federal-State Power-Sharing Arrangement
¶55

The third, and most promising, option is to continue the tradition of cooperation
between the states and federal government. Working together, states and the federal
government built low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities in the 1960s.195 Congress
and the states also supported the power-sharing arrangements in the Policy Act and the
Amendments Act.196
¶56
Many believe that New York left the burden and responsibility of low-level
radioactive waste disposal solely with the states and private generators.197 However, the
New York opinion only struck down one provision in the Amendments Act.198 Justice
O’Connor was clear: the federal incentives, penalties, or other provisions in any low-level
radioactive waste legislation are unconstitutional only if the penalties are coercive.199
¶57
In fact, the New York decision referenced one power-sharing arrangement that has
quite a bit of potential for addressing the current federal-state stalemate. According to
Justice O’Connor, the federal government can place conditions on the receipt of federal
funds.200 The case Justice O’Connor used as precedent was South Dakota v. Dole.201 In
Dole, South Dakota challenged a federal law that directed Elizabeth Dole, then-Secretary
of Transportation, to withhold a percentage of federal highway funds from states “‘in
which the purchase or public possession . . . of any alcoholic beverage by a person who is
less than twenty-one years of age is lawful.’”202 The Court upheld the law under the
Spending Clause’s broad grant of power to Congress.203 Furthermore, the Court noted
that “[w]e have also held that a perceived Tenth Amendment limitation on congressional
regulation of state affairs did not concomitantly limit the range of conditions legitimately
placed on federal grants.”204 Thus, under Dole, the federal government could regulate
low-level radioactive waste by making federal funds contingent on a state developing a
disposal site.205
194
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¶58

To encourage states to develop low-level radioactive waste disposal sites, Congress
could mirror the provisions of the Amendments Act that the New York opinion already
deemed to be legitimate regulations under the Commerce Clause and the Spending
Clause. For example, Congress could offer incentives to states with disposal sites by
allowing disposal facilities to continue to restrict access and increase fees for out-ofcompact waste.206 States with disposal sites could also continue to restrict access to those
states within its interstate compact.207 As low-level waste disposal became more
expensive and difficult to secure, states without disposal sites would have an incentive to
develop sites within the state or the various interstate compacts. Finally, instead of the
take-title provision, Congress could offer additional federal grants, as discussed in Dole,
that were contingent on states developing low-level radioactive waste disposal sites.208
¶59
A potential argument against relying on Dole is the Court’s warning that, in some
circumstances, financial incentives offered by Congress might pass the point at which
“pressure turns into compulsion.”209 In other words, the more money the federal
government offers, the closer the incentive becomes to coerced regulation.210 The
Court’s caveat was not problematic in Dole because a state that refused to raise the legal
drinking age to twenty-one lost only a relatively small percentage of certain federal
highway funds.211 On the other hand, states will likely require a significant financial
incentive, well above five percent of federal highway funds, to develop low-level
radioactive waste disposal sites.
¶60
There are two important differences between the coercive regulation mentioned in
Dole and the proposed low-level radioactive waste incentive packages. First, states will
have a meaningful choice whether or not to accept the financial package. Unlike the law
in Dole, which sought compliance from each individual state, the federal government
needs only a handful of states to develop low-level radioactive waste disposal sites.
Congress will have no incentive to pressure those states that strongly oppose developing
a low-level radioactive waste disposal site, giving states what Justice O’Connor found to
be the “critical alternative”—the ability to decline the federal program.212
¶61
Second, one of the issues in Dole was that the law allowed the federal government
to withhold federal highway funds from states that did not comply with the national
drinking age.213 In contrast, states that agree to develop a low-level radioactive waste
disposal site will be eligible to receive additional funds. Thus, a state cannot claim that
reliance on expected funds, already allocated to crucial programs in a forward-looking
budgetary process, is coercing its participation in a federal program.214 Rather the state

206

See 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(1) (2006).
See § 2021e(d) & (f).
208
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) (“We have also held that a perceived Tenth
Amendment limitation on congressional regulation of state affairs did not concomitantly limit the range of
conditions legitimately placed on federal grants.”).
209
Id. at 211 (internal citation omitted).
210
See id.
211
Id.
212
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992).
213
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987).
214
See id. at 211 (discussing what South Dakota stood to lose by refusing to participate in the national
program).
207

202

Vol. 5:1]

Samantha Dreilinger

would have the option to accept additional funding, and, as Justice O’Connor stated in
New York, optional incentives are not coercive.215
¶62
The decisions in Dole and New York offer a potential solution: the federal
government may offer states monetary incentives to take part in federal programs,
providing that the incentives do not coerce participation. In addition, 2009’s unique
financial and political atmosphere makes financial incentives a plausible solution. The
2008 economic crisis left states with deficits in the hundreds of millions, or even billions,
of dollars.216 As state governments continually struggle to fill budgetary gaps, state
officials are likely to be more amenable to federal programs that provide additional
funding.
¶63
Widespread financial difficulties also provide state and federal officials with an
opportunity to develop a low-level radioactive waste disposal site with support, rather
than opposition, from the community. State officials are already making very unpopular
decisions to increase tuition at public universities,217 limit municipal services,218 and raise
taxes.219 In light of these options, NIMBY activists and community leaders may see a
low-level radioactive waste disposal site as a better, if not ideal, solution. With the
highest unemployment rates in decades,220 communities may even welcome the
additional jobs created by the construction and maintenance of a low-level radioactive
waste disposal site.
¶64
In previous years, the mere mention of a low-level radioactive waste disposal site
would bring immediate, virulent protests.221 However, by offering new jobs and
economic growth, government officials could finally discuss the fears associated with and
misconceptions about disposal sites with a receptive, if tentative, audience. For example,
community activists are concerned that low-level radioactive waste disposal sites pose
significant environmental and health risks.222 They view disposal sites as huge industrial
facilities that spew toxins into air, water, and food. In reality, low-level radioactive waste
disposal sites bear a stronger resemblance to national parks than steel factories. Low215
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level radioactive waste disposal happens underground. Once a container is buried, it
must be left undisturbed for thirty years. As a result, a low-level radioactive waste
disposal site requires acres of undeveloped land.223 Government officials could then
explain that, although not without risk, developments in storage technology and modern
environmental regulations have also removed many of the risks of leakage and
groundwater contamination. They could also emphasize that the current system, which
allows for hundreds if not thousands of unofficial, undisclosed, makeshift storage
facilities throughout the state, poses a much greater risk to communities.
¶65
An effective education campaign combined with economic incentives has
persuaded communities to accept other kinds of waste disposal sites. Tullytown,
Pennsylvania, for example, welcomed a new landfill after discussions with government
officials resulted in an agreement to infuse the old mining town’s budget with $48 million
over fifteen years.224 Arrangements like the deal negotiated in Tullytown benefit the
states by allowing them to develop disposal facilities in areas with low land costs near
sources of waste. The arrangements also benefit the communities by providing
compensation for accepting the risks associated with hosting a disposal site.225
¶66
It is possible that generous incentive packages and well-presented educational
campaigns will fail to overcome communities’ reservations about hosting a low-level
radioactive waste disposal site. However, 2008’s economic crisis makes this solution
more plausible than in the past. At worst, implementing a federal-state power-sharing
arrangement will be an improvement on the status quo because it will prevent low-level
radioactive waste from accumulating in multiple, undisclosed locations across the
country, and it will reintroduce the problem of low-level radioactive waste disposal to
policymakers. At best, this proposal will lead to mutually beneficial arrangements that
result in the development of desperately needed low-level radioactive waste disposal
sites, as well as the long-awaited resolution of the United States’ low-level radioactive
waste problem.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

¶67

The United States cannot continue to ignore its low-level radioactive waste
problem. The amount of low-level radioactive waste currently exceeds the country’s
disposal capabilities, and valuable scientific research and the quest for clean energy will
likely result in the production of even more waste. Working independently, state
governments have not developed a single new disposal site for low-level radioactive
waste. Congress’ attempts to address the problem culminated in the Amendments Act
almost fifteen years ago. All the while, low-level radioactive waste has continued to
accumulate in thousands of undisclosed warehouses across the nation.226
¶68
Despite the thirty year stalemate, there are potential solutions to the United States’
low-level radioactive waste problem. The most promising proposal is a new federal-state
power-sharing arrangement. The economic crisis presents state and government officials
with a unique opportunity to negotiate a mutually beneficial incentive package that
223
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allows for the development of desperately needed disposal sites, while providing states
and local communities with additional funds and new jobs. Although this solution might
not successfully overcome the traditionally strong community opposition to waste
disposal sites, it does complete the first step: to reintroduce the low-level radioactive
waste problem and highlight the pressing need for a solution.
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